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The causes and consequences of climate change are to varying degrees understood, 
produced and faced by various societies across the planet. The projected scope of its 
consequences and the underdetermination thereof causes much public contestation. 
Scholars of climate change communication express various positions towards the 
nature of the issue and the purpose of science communicative efforts. Through a 
literature review of research articles on climate change communication published 
between 2010 and 2018, I show that top-down approaches to communication based on 
psychological considerations are frequently argued to provide the necessary response 
to public uncertainty and disagreement on the issue. Linking these, and other, positions 
to epistemological and political considerations, I offer a liberal democratic critique of 
this conception of climate change communication as both ideologically and 
pragmatically questionable.     
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This research set out with the aim of analysing how various conceptions of climate 
change communication relate to positions on the desirability of a pervasive consensus 
on or contestation of the issue of climate change. Scientific consensus and the 
communication thereof to the public, presumed to be the progenitor of the end of the 
climate change debate, has done anything but lay the public contestation of the issue 
to rest (Pearce, et al., 2017). Inspired by pluralist thinkers (Rescher, 1993; Mouffe, 
2013) and previous research (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2016), the aim of this thesis is 
to analyse and critique the interrelation of epistemological, methodological, and political 
positions towards climate change communication found in contemporary scientific 
literature.  
This thesis is written in the firm belief that the ways in which the issue of anthropogenic 
climate change and the communication pertaining to it is conceived and discussed in 
the scientific literature is relevant, carries responsibility, and has impact on human 
affairs that take place outside of it. This is inarguably the case when this literature is 
articulating strategies for communication efforts directed at affecting those who are 
involved in the activities that are subjected and give rise to the consequences that 
follow from climate change. Problematic conceptions of climate change communication 
are hereby believed to carry with them the risk of detrimental ramifications for the 
societies affected by it and the political processes involved in their governance. If one, 
prima facie, takes objection to aspects of the perspectives expressed in this scientific 
literature, it promises a fruitful undertaking to thoroughly evaluate these conceptions 
and the arguments they present. This is what I am doing through the research 
presented in this thesis. The impetus is thus two-fold. First, to acquire a thorough 
understanding of the perspectives expressed in the existing literature on climate 
change communication and to properly account for the arguments presented by it. 
Second, to offer, if applicable, a critique of these perspectives. 
Several research questions have been posited to guide the process from the 
identification of the relevant literature, to the analysis of its perspectives and 
arguments, to ultimately the development of a critique to these. The questions guiding 
this thesis are as follows: 
– How do different articles within contemporary scientific literature conceive of the 
function and role of climate change communication as a practice, its purpose as 
a research endeavour, and how do these conceptions relate to larger questions 
about epistemology and political processes? 
– Which aspects of the conceptions of climate change communication pervade 
throughout the literature, and which are scarcely found? 
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– What positions expressed in the literature can be grouped into more or less 
coherent categories, what are their categorical characteristics, and how do 
these categories differ from each other? 
– What are the potential issues emerging from the expressed positions towards 
climate change communication, in particular the social and political 
consequences of the discourses they propagate? 
The first three of the four questions are rather operational in that the reason of pursuing 
them derives from the insights they provide for answering the fourth one. It is this latter 
question that posits the larger purpose of this research, namely to develop a critique 
towards the found positions. My aim thereby is to rearticulate the need for researchers 
to reflect on their contributions to the social construction of climate change and society 
at large. In what follow I will briefly introduce the topic of discussion by sketching the 
background of climate change.  
1.1 The Issue of Climate Change 
Climate change, in the broadest understanding, denotes a shift in the distribution of 
weather patterns in variously sized contexts, such as the hemispherical transitions in 
and out of glacial periods or the onset of climatic anomalies such as the Medieval 
Warm Period in the North Atlantic. The understanding of the term that I am employing 
in this thesis is more accurately described as anthropogenic climate change, frequently 
also referred to as global warming. Article 1, paragraph 2 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change defines climate change in accordance with 
this understanding as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to 
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere” (United Nations, 
1992). 
The idea that human activity can, at least in local contexts, change climatic conditions 
can already be found in writings from classical antiquity, with writers such as 
Theophrastus describing the climatic cooling of Larissa, Greece, in the wake of 
extensive drainage of local swamps (Neumann, 1985). That humans may in fact impact 





 century, leading to the longitudinal studies of atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations by American scientist Charles David Keeling. Keeling’s research 
culminated in one of the most famous graphical depictions of climate science, the 
eponymous Keeling Curve (Hulme, 2009, pp. 54-56). This concern for atmospheric 
concentration of certain so-called greenhouse gasses (GHG) is explicitly named in the 
aforementioned climate change definition of the UNFCCC, and has become the 
cornerstone of climate science. Much of the leading research conducted in line with the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) builds on the analysis of 
cumulative anthropogenic GHG emissions (IPCC, 2014, p. 8). The effect of this change 
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in the composition of atmospheric gasses is, chiefly, an increase of global mean 
surface temperature that has been varyingly extrapolated with the help of scenario 
projections. These attempt to account for the different possibilities of physical and 
socio-economic developments and climate policy initiatives.  
The baseline scenarios of the most recent IPCC report, meaning those scenarios that 
assume no additional efforts to constrain emissions, project the increase of global 
mean surface temperature to be anywhere between 1.4°C and 4.8°C compared to that 
around the turn of the 3
rd
 millennium (IPCC, 2014, p. 10). The contingency of the 
predictions of climate change’s consequences does, of course, not stop here. It is on 
the basis of these varying scenarios that a range of potential effects on a wide variety 
of meteorological, hydrological, and geological processes are predicted to take place. 
Examples for this are sea level rise due to glacial melting, the thermal expansion of 
oceans, and the increase in frequency of extreme weather events. What ramifications 
these physical changes have and will have on human societies, and how these 
consequences are faced differently by different regions, social groups or individual 
people, adds yet another level of contingency. That the different projections trying to 
account for these contingencies are widely diverging, even when they only account for 
a limited set of potential scenarios such as the baseline, raises the pervasive issue of 
underdetermination that underlies much of the discussion within this thesis. 
Due to the uncertainties in the available scientific knowledge of climate change, in 
particular in regard to its potential consequences, climate change is not ultimately 
scientifically determined. In addition to the uncertainty of climate change’s potential 
consequences, they are to the best of the available knowledge projected to have global 
scope, be in many ways irreversible, and may have far-reaching and devastating 
effects on social and ecological systems. Because of these extraordinarily high stakes 
paired with a certain level of indeterminableness the issue is subsumed under what has 
been termed post-normal science (Hulme, 2009, pp. 78-79). In contrast to regular 
applied science and its commitment to neutral disinterestedness, post-normal science 
operates with high-risk, uncertain, and value-invested issues that require 
communicative efforts not just to bring public attention to these risks and uncertainties 
but to establish urgently needed, or so perceived, decisions. In this light climate change 
communication emerged as a practice deemed necessary by physical scientists and 
environmentalists to disseminate their insights and concerns to a larger audience 
(Moser, 2010, p. 33). It is in this context that climate change in its physical dimension 
has become inextricably linked with the communicative efforts and practices 
surrounding it. As I will mention in section 2.1 and later show through my analysis, 
these origins of climate change communication as a directed effort and means for 
awareness raising and information dissemination continue to have severe implications 
for the approaches taken towards it. 
4 
 
1.2 Scope and Positioning 
This thesis takes several positions in and directions towards the scope of its research, 
some of which I want to name explicitly here. First, this research rests on an 
epistemological commitment to social constructionism and contextualism. In its social 
constructionist positioning, it builds on the assumption that what people know of the 
world rests, ultimately, on shared social understandings of physical reality—
understandings which are not a mere perceptive derivation but socially constructed 
ones (Burr, 2003, p. 6). This means, as a consequence, that the impartial materiality of 
a change in meteorological conditions is subordinated in its social significance to the 
imparted meaning of climate change. What people think of climate change both directs 
their actions to a greater degree and carries greater social consequences than its 
objective physicality does, and does itself reinforce what others think of it in turn. This 
circumstance puts significant weight on the approaches to and modes of 
communication surrounding the issue. It is through communication between people that 
the meaning of climate change is shared and imparted.  
Further, the contextualist position taken in this thesis asserts that different individuals 
have, given their differently situated contexts and the contingent experiences provided 
by these, epistemically justifiable divergent preferences (Rescher, 1993, p. 114). This 
means, concretely, that different people have justifiable different understandings of 
climate change. Not only does this result in equally different positions towards the 
communication surrounding the issue, but it means that the process of communication 
itself cannot be assumed to be have an ideal form or content that qualifies for a unified, 
top-down process of how and what to communicate. To avoid confusion on this point, 
this position does not rest on a radical epistemological relativism that considers each 
and any approach to reasoning as equally valid, but derives from the experiential 
conditions and limitations under which this reasoning is conducted. It is in this light that 
I will employ the term perspective to refer to the distinct experiential positions on whose 
grounds understandings are formed, meanings are given and, particularly in the case 
of communication research, arguments are built. 
Lastly, when I discuss politics I am doing so in reference to political processes and 
conditions in the context of liberal democratic systems. Consequently, any discussion 
of societies, publics, or citizens refer to the societies and citizens of the aforementioned 
liberal democratic contexts. One may rightly argue that this results in a construction of 
a representative ideal, a placeholder standing in for all potential concrete contexts to 
which the analysis may be applied. Such a construction is however, apart from being a 
methodologically desirable delineation for the analysis of an international body of 
literature, necessary to coalesce a variation of individual studies into coherent 
perspectives representative of their unified conceptions of the political, scientific, and 
communicative processes concerned with, most significantly, the global and context 
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transcending phenomenon of climate change. Ultimately, the limitation emerges out of 
the fact that the literature here analysed is written and published, with few exceptions, 
in liberal democratic countries of Europe and North America covering research on the 
cultural, social, and political systems of these regions. 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
Several aspects need to be considered that connect the issue of climate change to 
concerns of communication and other socio-political dimensions. In the following two 
subchapters I will discuss a number of definitional questions and theoretical 
considerations that explicate conceptions of climate change, communication, politics, 
and their relation to each other. 
2.1 Why Communicate Climate Change? 
In its broadest sense, one can call any communication concerning climate change, be it 
among researchers inquiring into the issue or political committees discussing the 
possible actions taken in response to it, climate change communication. In the 
literature on the topic however, the term climate change communication is commonly 
used to more narrowly refer to a form of strategic communication of climate change 
(Schafer, 2012; Pidgeon & Fischhof, 2011). Recalling the earlier mentioned impetus 
behind much of the discussions surrounding climate change communication as a 
necessary effort to tackle a high-risk issue, these notions of strategically 
communicating climate change rather than communicating about it may not be all too 
surprising, not to say any less problematic. 
Nerlich, Koteyko and Brown (2010) describe the inquiry into this so understood issue of 
climate change communication as the examination of: 
the role of communication in perceptions of climate change, […] the 
effectiveness of different tools in raising awareness and understanding of climate 
change […] (and) the barriers that may hinder […] subsequent motivation to act 
on these messages (p.97). 
Two striking notions of communication emerge from this understanding. First, that 
climate change communication ought to function as an effective tool through which 
some epistemic superior, someone aware and understanding of climate change, can 
disseminate knowledge to the uninformed to raise their level of awareness to his or her 
own. Second, that based on this disseminated knowledge the now enlightened ought to 
act according to the information they were given, and would do so were it not for some 
form of action-hindering barrier.  
These hierarchical understandings of communication relate strongly to two established 
areas of strategic communication studies, namely risk and change communication. The 
risk communicative perspective, which originates in crisis and emergency 
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management, sees communication in the role to inform, prepare and alleviate 
(Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). The receivers of what may accordingly be called climate 
risk communication ought to be informed on the risks they face, assisted in their 
preparations to face them, with the ultimate goal of preventing future detrimental 
effects. Meanwhile the perspective of change communication, originating in 
organizational management, is concerned with enticing behavioural changes, guiding 
actions, and managing the potential resistances to these desired adaptions (Elving, 
2005). In the context of climate change, these change communicative approaches aim 
for example at facilitating the acceptance of regulations or the engagement in low 
carbon lifestyles (Ockwell, et al., 2009). In both cases, the strategic element of 
communication is found in its attempt to disseminate information or induce action. To 
be sure, there are contemporary voices arguing against a simple top-down conception 
of risk and change communication, advocating instead for dialogue over dissemination 
and the integration of community-based knowledge (e.g. Genilo, 2018). 
This understanding of climate change communication is further related to a more 
general theoretical conception of communication that, in many ways, is at its basis, 
namely the transmission model of communication, a variation of which is also known as 
the Shannon-Weaver model after the two American mathematicians that popularized it 
in the late 1940s (Craig, 1999, p. 122). In the transmission model, communication is 
conceived as the unidirectional process of information transfer, in which a source 
neutrally transmits an item of information that, after being subjected to potential 
interference, is received and reconstructed at its destination. This kind of 
unidirectionality may well account for the strategic communicational approaches 
sketched above. Interestingly, approaches that employ an understanding of climate 
change communication along the abovementioned lines are often theoretically averse 
to the transmission model of communication and rather explicit in their rejection of its 
claims over the simple transferability of neutral information (e.g. Kahan, 2010). 
Arguments for the use of what are in essence information transmission strategies can 
be found pre- and succeeded by expressions of scepticism over the ability of the 
transmission model to capture the breadth of communicative processes. In the 
operational approaches to communication they advocate then, they continue to follow 
much of the same arguments, with some of the major differences being that the sender 
has to find ways to account for, avert or rectify various culturally subjective, normative 
and cognitive distortions on the receiver’s part. The concerns so expressed thus seem 
to be directed at specific iterations of the model rather than its essential premises. 
2.2 Why Contest Climate Change? 
To begin the discussion of why climate change represent a topic of political 
contestation, I want to first clarify a number of concepts. The context this study 
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considers for its discussion of political processes is, as mentioned in the introduction, 
that of liberal democratic systems. Political systems are considered liberal and 
democratic to the degree to which they sustain and guarantee the rights to democratic 
rule, i.e. the institution of an accountable government that is formed through direct 
participation or representation by and of its general population, and political liberties, 
i.e. the ability to express political positions and advocacy e.g. through forms of media 
or formation of and participation in political groups (Bollen & Paxton, 2000, pp. 59-60). 
Politics are thus, broadly speaking, both the processes of decision making through the 
exertion of this democratic rule, and the expressions and advocacies of positions 
towards these decisions on the basis of political liberties. Due to their grounding in 
enacted rights, politics are instantiated practices that take place in concrete moments 
of human coordination (Mouffe, 2013, p. 2).  
Politics are here not to be confused with my use of the conceptual term the political. 
With the political I am referring to the underlying condition of contestability within the 
abovementioned processes of decision making and advocacy—the “ineradicable 
dimension of antagonism” (Mouffe, 2008). To reiterate, the form of contestation seen 
as ineradicable by the political takes place within the context of and channels provided 
by the abovementioned political liberties – it is a contestation of positions taken within 
liberal democratic rule, not of democratic rule itself. This is to say that the concept of 
the political is under no illusion that decision making processes or political advocacy 
are (beyond the purely epistemic level) contestable in all contexts, e.g. should liberal 
democratic processes be terminated through state violence. It is further not a distinct 
form of liberal democratic politics, but a condition and characteristic of them. The 
political is a postfoundationalist conception that acknowledges the pervasive potential 
for dissensus and political conflict in the ever-underdetermined world we inhabit, and is 
as such as much an epistemic concept and argument as it is a political one (Winter, 
2013, p. 131). It is important to point out that in its conditioning of political contestation 
the political is not merely an inevitable side-effect but the precondition of liberal 
democratic processes. It is the crucible of democratic rule and political liberties, both of 
which would cease to exist or in any case transform into perfect echo chambers should 
the contestability of positions yield to a permanent consensus (Phillips & Jorgensen, 
2002, p. 187). To be sure, this is not to say that a consensus on any specific issue is a 
threat to the democratic system in which it emerged, nor that all positions on 
consensus envision it as permanent and all-pervasive. In any case however, the 
political rejects the idea that contestation can ever become obsolete or unfeasible 
within a liberal democracy and the political liberties on which it rests. 
The concept of the political is of great importance for two reasons. First, it offers an 
inherent connection between the epistemological considerations and the political 
consequences that emerge from them. Second, because both the epistemic claim that 
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it posits, namely that issues are inevitably underdetermined, and its political conclusion, 
that political conflict over these issues is ineradicable, relate squarely to the here 
discussed issues of the social construction of climate change and its political 
contestation. As such, it aligns with and strengthens both the contextualist argument 
made at the onset of this thesis and the notion of the underdetermination of climate 
change. In these dimensions, the communication of climate change relates to the 
political in two ways. First, the approaches taken towards and advocated for climate 
change communication are themselves subjected to the same possibility of 
contestation as climate change itself is. Second, in their expression of the underlying 
assumptions of the determination of climate change and the function of its 
communication, the literature on climate change communication exposits within these 
assumptions its positions towards the political, i.e. the legitimate contestability of 
climate change and its communication. 
In its commitment to an inevitability of dissensus, the concept of the political is of 
course diametrically opposed to the notions of a pervasive consensus regarding 
climate change that, as I mentioned in the introduction, are commonly posited as the 
desiderata of the climate debate. The quest for consensual agreement concerning 
climate change is however more than merely incompatible with or considered futile by 
the concept of the political. In so far as the quest for consensus is dismissive of the 
political and aims at the delegitimisation of climate change as a contestable issue fit for 
a warranted plurality of conflicting opinions and legitimate subjection to contentious 
political debate, it actively subverts liberal democratic processes (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001, p. 173). These efforts can, to be sure, itself engage in political advocacy and 
argue for their preferred political decisions. As I will show in the upcoming analysis 
however, the notions of consensus discussed by many of these positions extend well 
beyond a contentious, democratically posed argument for agreement.  
There are, of course, more specific and issue directed arguments for the consideration 
of climate change as a contestable political issue that go beyond the 
postfoundationalist contestability of all political advocacies and, even more broadly, 
epistemic claims. While the historical concerns for local climates mentioned earlier are 
far from what is considered the global issue of anthropogenic climate change today, 
they already capture an essential aspect of the phenomenon that is cause for much of 
its controversy: its generation by some form of resource extraction or consumption. 
From German climatologist Eduard Brückner arguing to the Prussian House of 
Representatives to reduce deforestation in order to maintain climatic conditions in the 
late 19th century (Storch & Stehr, 2006), to calls for substantial reductions of fossil fuel 
consumption in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014, p. 110), the 
countervailing measures to climate change, in particular those of mitigation, are usually 
connected to some form of reduction of economic activity. In a limited world with 
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shared resources, the conflicts of interest emerging from this juxtaposition are 
concerned with mutually-binding decisions made by the public, i.e. the general 
population of a certain polity, of which those who hold the interests are part. As people 
are constrained either by the limitation of their consumption or by the absence of the 
so-consumed resources and its consequences, these varying interests will find 
themselves equally justified in their contextually contingent position. 
Further, the causes, social constructions and consequences of climate change are to 
varying degrees understood by, found in, and faced by various societies across the 
planet. Since we are dealing with equally varying degrees of uncertainty, causation, 
and imperilment make the issue fundamentally and inevitably a political one. 
Fundamentally so, as it relates to causes, effects and responses that exceed the 
individual, and as such relate to the very core of the political process of making and 
coordinating decisions of and for groups of people. Inevitably so, as the variation in 
understanding, causation, and affectedness carries with it differences in interest and 
conviction that will continue to exist even in societies of epistemic ideal in which 
absolute knowledge of the issue is available and every member possesses the same 
amount of information. In any case, we neither have absolute knowledge of climate 
change nor live in societies in which the knowledge that has been secured is available 
equally to everyone. How any particular society ought to ultimately act in its response is 
an inherently value-invested question that is contingent not just on their particular 
context and relation to climate change, but on what is considered desirable and what 
world people envision to live in. These questions cannot be answered uniformly by 
some final scientific comprehension of what climate change is. 
3. Methodology  
In line with the research impetus of critically analysing and expositing the perspectives 
expressed in the existing literature on climate change communication, this research 
takes the form of a qualitative literature review and critique. It will build on an analysis 
of peer-reviewed social scientific research literature on climate change communication 
published in scientific journals that are abstracted in the Scopus database.  
The choice to conduct a literature review has several reasons and implications. First, 
as I am interested in the ways in which communication is conceptualized and argued to 
be approached in the scientific discourse surrounding climate change, it stands to 
reason to use one of the primary fora where such discourse is instantiated, i.e. 
produced and reproduced, namely research articles. With discourses I here refer to the 
modes by which people express aspects of reality and on the basis of expressions to 
and by others perceive and construct these aspects. The focus is however not on the 
research results reported on as such, but the ensuing discussions and conclusions 
drawn from them and the assumptions on which the research is built. This is to say that 
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I am not aiming to cumulatively synthesize the research findings as they are presented 
in the analysed literature, but to critically analyze the questions the literature choses to 
posit, the approaches taken towards answering them, their underlying assumptions, 
and the conclusions and recommendations drawn from them. The premise here is—to 
once more draw on the epistemological position of this thesis which I have by now 
expressed in many terms such as postfoundationalist, constructionist or contextualist—
that empirical research results can and have to be interpreted and are so in various 
ways, and as such reveal only partially, and subordinately, the argumentative thrust of 
a particular study. Second, research articles are a readily available and secure source 
of scientific discussion, and as such present research objects that are easily accessible 
to both me and, if applicable, a reader who may wish to review my, equally interpretive, 
reading of them. The limitation to research articles is a further attempt to unify the 
medium of the discussions as to make a grouping of perspectives within them a more 
feasible undertaking. The assumption underlying this approach is that the exposited 
perspectives represent elements of the scientific and political discourses about, in 
particular, climate change and communication that exist within, through, and outside of 
the here analysed articles. These discourses exist through and within the articles as 
the literature itself, as mentioned earlier, produces and reproduces them. They also 
exist outside of the literature, both in that the literature is implicated by and itself 
implicates discourses existing throughout other media and fora for expression. In their 
active production and reproduction through expressions, discourses draw on each 
other and are themselves subjected to a condition of contingency that, similar to that of 
the political in the realm of liberal democracies, allows for their contestation. It is in this 
light then that the critique presented in this thesis can be understood as engaging in 
the discursive struggle over how the issues surrounding climate change communication 
are expressed and constructed. 
One reservation has to be made explicit here. What I am discussing and at times 
critiquing in this thesis are the perspectives of authors as they are expressed in the 
articles. Since there is no possibility of further explication by the authors of their 
position, I want to reserve any claim towards the authors’ personal or otherwise 
professionally expressed views on the subject. When I thus speak of a perspective of 
or in the literature, even when I out of written expression speak of an author’s 
perspective, I am referring to the imparted perspective as I analyse it in the written text. 
As mentioned, the Scopus abstract and citation database is used for the identification 
of articles to use in the analysis. The reasoning for this is solely based on the fact that 
Scopus is the largest database of such sort and thus allows for the most inclusive 
search within the existing literature (Elsevier, 2018). The candidate articles were 
identified first by a Boolean keyword search, and then ordered by relevance according 
to the number of article citations. I limited the search to abstract, titles, and keywords of 
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articles published during or after 2010, the year the IPCC began work on its Fifth 
Assessment Report. The purpose of a restriction of timeframe is two-fold. First, it 
ensures that the analysed articles are contemporary and relevant to the ongoing 
scientific discussion. Second, given my selection criterion of citation numbers, the 
inclusion of vastly older articles further exacerbates the degree to which the amount of 
citation rests on the article age and thus the amount of literature published since that 
could potentially cite the article in question, rather than its ongoing reception by the 
scientific community.  
For the article database query it was necessary to decide on some definitional basis of 
climate change communication. Employing the earlier discussed definition in its entire 
depth is problematic in this regard. While a narrow definition is useful for expressing 
the various particularities of a concept, using it for databank search queries significantly 
increases the risk of excluding viable candidate articles from the empirical data due to 
their mismatch with the employed definition. A definition that in turn is too broad is 
equally problematic, as it produces work intensive data pollution by including candidate 
articles that are unrelated to the research. I thus decided to use a broadly inclusive but 
epistemologically positioned definition that provides itself no normativity or criteria of 
purpose and avoids a distorting pre-selection in the resulting overview. By such 
approach, climate change communication was defined as the communicative 
processes involved in the social construction of climate change and its endowment with 
meaning and significance. The implicit social constructionist perspective in this 
definition is to position it epistemologically and to ensure a modicum of exclusionary 
criterion as to what type of literature is to be included in the analysis, i.e. social 
scientific literature.  
Building on this definition of climate change communication I developed several 
keyword matrices and abstract screened the resulting articles. I found that splitting the 
keyword of climate change (and similar terms) from that of communication (and, again, 
similar terms) resulted in roughly half of the articles being unrelated, discussing in turn 
issues such as bird migration patterns, health inequity, or various analyses of 
geophysical processes related to climate change. I ultimately decided to split the 
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The search returned a total of 315 articles. Aiming for a total of twenty articles to 
analyse, the most cited results were first abstract-screened and then skim-read one by 
one to filter out any articles that did not discuss the issue of climate change 
communication to a degree that allowed for an analysis of the perspectives taken 
towards or approaches advocated for in it. Of the twenty most cited articles four had to 
be excluded on the basis of this content criterion. One additional article by Wibeck 
(2014) was excluded on the basis of its methodology. Wibeck’s study of research 
literature on climate change communication published between 2000 and 2011 is, as a 
literature review on the same topic, very close to my own research. While the 
difference in the time-frame analysed meant that Wibeck’s study built on different data, 
I decided that a review of a review is not conducive to my intended analysis. Wibeck’s 
study ultimately was able to contribute more as a resource of inspiration and 
demarcation for this thesis than it would have as one of many articles in the analysis. 
The five so excluded articles resulted in the inclusion of the twenty-first to twenty-fifth 
most cited articles. 
As mentioned in the introduction, I am looking to analyse the epistemological, 
methodological, and political positions towards climate change communication and, 
where applicable, the interrelation between them. To guide the analysis of the articles, 
the following questions provided the focus of my reading: 
– What is the impetus for, approach to, and intended contribution of the research? 
– How is the issue of climate change posited and problematized? 
– What is conceived to be communicated, how, and by whom? 
– For what purpose is it conceived to be communicated? 
– What are the conceived problems of this communication? 
4. Analysis 
Within the selected twenty articles, I found three distinct perspectives that allowed 
themselves to be grouped by consistent characteristics. While individual articles within 
each of the three groups differ as to the extend or severity of the ascribed positions, the 
group characteristics I will lay out in Table 1 to Table 3 give an overview of the various 
pervasive notions found within them. I named the three perspectives according to their 
                                            
 
1
 Resulting in the search string: ( TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ("climate change communication"  
OR  "climate communication"  OR  "climate science communication"  OR  "global 
warming communication"  OR  "environmental communication" OR "communicating 
climate change"  OR  "communicating global warming") )  AND  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( 
"underst*"  OR  "perce*"  OR  "mean*"  OR  ( "skeptic*"  OR  "sceptic*" )  OR  "social* 
construct*" ) ) )  AND  DOCTYPE ( ar )  AND  PUBYEAR  >  2009 
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conception of the function and purpose of climate change communication respectively 
as persuasion, critique, and facilitation. Positions across the three perspectives range 
from arguing for a unilateral, top-down, persuasion of people through strategically 
customized and targeted communication to more participatory, bottom-up processes, 
arguing for integrative and multilateral engagement and inclusion of citizens. 
Of the twenty analysed articles, thirteen were categorised as persuasion, four as 
critique, and three as facilitation. Given the small sample size, the directed query 
(pertaining to social constructionism), the limitation to one databank (Scopus), and the 
biased sampling method (number of citations), one cannot draw any conclusion as to 
the frequency of such perspectives in the larger climate change communication 
literature. A control query leaving out any keywords of the 2
nd
 column of the keyword 
matrix pertaining to social constructionism revealed however, that the majority (16 out 
of 20) of the most cited articles would remain the same whether one includes social 
constructionist keywords or not. It thus not clear to what extend the sample here 
analysed diverges from generally well received articles within the literature. 
Each of the three perspectives is introduced with a tabular overview, followed by a 
more detailed discussion. All three columns contain both descriptive and analytical 
elements. The first column presents the conceptions of what climate change 
communication is, what it is used for, and why it is researched. The second column 
describes the various problems and issues that are conceived to pertain to climate 
change and its communication. The third column on the political describes the 
conceptions of dissensus, social construction, and scientific knowledge. 
4.1 Persuasion 
Table 1. Perspective I: Persuasion  
Articles Perspective on CCC as a 
Practice and Research 
Perspective on why CCC 
is of Concern 




Most of the literature in this perspective is methodologically grounded in social 
psychology and guided by psychological investigations into the cognitive processes of 
individuals and groups. Many authors eschew a cognitivist stance that attempts to pry 
into the black boxes of people’s minds, and instead focus on the social and 
environmental conditions that produce barriers to the acceptance of communicated 
information (Nursey-Bray, et al., 2012; Scannell & Gifford, 2013; Stoknes, 2014; 
Schweizer, et al., 2013; Lee, et al., 2015; Manzo, 2010). Here, one can distinguish 
between two foci. The first is primarily concerned with various forms of “cultural and 
individual biases” (Nursey-Bray, et al., 2012, p. 754), such as general socio-
demographics (Lee, et al., 2015), identities (Stoknes, 2014), or attachments (Scannell 
& Gifford, 2013), and as such sees the barriers of communication lying foremost with 
the audiences addressed. The second, far from ignorant of the former, looks more 
closely into the problems of communicating a global issue with “invisible risks” (Manzo, 
2010, p. 197) such as climate change in “salient and tangible messages” (Schweizer, 
et al., 2013, p. 59), and as such sees the communicative barriers to be an aspect of the 
issue itself and the limitations to its presentability. In both foci, however, climate change 
communication is the strategic approach to overcome these barriers.  
Other authors do not refrain from ascribing the issues that climate change 
communication faces in making the public accept scientific knowledge and comply with 
policies to more general, trans-contextual psychological characteristics of people 
(Kronrod, et al., 2012; Sterman, 2011; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Howell, 2011; Zia & 
Todd, 2010). Kronrod et al. (2012) for example caution, that the use of assertive 
language in communicative approaches may conflict with and in fact trigger people’s 
“drive for freedom” (p. 95), a drive that when not circumvented not only hinders the 
possibilities of persuading them to act but may in fact result in heightened resistance. 
Manzo; 
Lee et al.; 
Nursey-Bray 
et al.; 

















CCC is discussed and advocated 
as a strategic communication 
effort by experts, risk 
communicators and 
organizations with the purpose 
to disseminate knowledge, 
alter attitudes, ensure 
compliance with policies, and 
induce behavioural changes. 
 
The purpose of researching 
CCC is to advance scientific 
understanding of the effects of 
specific communication 
strategies, such as emotional 
and spatial appeals, framing or 
use of assertive language, the 
contexts in which they can be 
most effectively employed, and 
the structure and impact of 
people’s mental models. 
There are gaps between 
attitude and behaviour and 
between scientific and 
public understanding, thus 
both education and 
persuasion are required to 
produce desired climate 
change action. CCC is a tool 
needed to close these gaps. 
 
A range of conditions 
complicate this 
communication, such as: 
psychological distance to 
the issue of climate 
change, lack of awareness, 
individual and political 
ideologies, ignorance, 
complacency,  
unwillingness, biases and 
other cognitive barriers. 
Dissensus is discussed as 
the result of biases and 
ignorance. The 
politicization of climate 
change can be overcome 




values, and worldviews 
are of concern in so far 
as they influence the 
effectiveness of 
communication 
strategies and the 
acceptance and 
compliance with policies. 
  
Scientific knowledge is 
argued to be the 
objective basis on which 
to make policy decisions. 
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Elsewhere, authors argue that people’s emotive responses to communication, such as 
fear, have to be utilized meticulously and treated as both a resource and a constrain 
depending on the specific characteristics of the communicated issue and its relation to 
the respective audience (Spence & Pidgeon, 2010, p. 658; Howell, 2011, p. 178). 
Sterman (2011) goes further and argues that people in general are limited in their 
mental abilities to flawed and entrenched mental models that lead to “pervasive errors 
and biases in judgment and decision making” (p. 813). These flaws, in turn, produce 
the pervasive gaps between scientific and public understanding of climate change and 
have to, accordingly, “be remedied” (ibid., p. 811). Zia & Todd (2010) share Sterman’s 
concern for these mental flaws and limitations. The danger that lies in uncorrected 
mental models, they argue, is that they produce conflicts with scientific knowledge and 
resistances to science based policy measures, which in turn undermines “effective 
levels of participation in mitigation practices” (Zia & Todd, 2010, p. 747). 
In terms of epistemological positioning and the political, the literature in this perspective 
uniformly places the scientific knowledge of climate change and the consensus within 
the scientific community regarding that knowledge at the centre of its premises. Of the 
thirteen articles, twelve explicitly discuss scientific consensus on the outset of their 
argument through direct reference to the IPCC or with other expressions such as 
“strong scientific consensus” (Sterman, 2011, p. 811), “almost universal consensus in 
the scientific community” (Poortinga, et al., 2011, p. 1017), “scientific agreement” 
(Evans, et al., 2014, p. 71) or “widespread scientific conclusion” (Lee, et al., 2015, p. 
1014). This level of scientific consensus is commonly put into contrast with a 
comparatively lower level of public agreement, which in turn is variously problematized 
as gaps of communication (Nursey-Bray, et al., 2012, p. 755), trust (Zia & Todd, 2010, 
p. 745), understanding (Sterman, 2011, p. 812), attention (Schweizer, et al., 2013, p. 
44), or concern (Scannell & Gifford, 2013, p. 62). A public dissensus regarding climate 
change is thus one produced by the aforementioned biases and various forms of gaps 
between what people do know and think and what they ought to know and think about 
the issue. 
Stoknes (2014) goes as far as to dedicate his article to the issue of, what he calls, the 
“climate paradox” (p. 161) – namely, that an increase of scientific agreement and 
understanding has coincided with a decline in perceived importance by the public. 
Stoknes is, however, clear in that the issue for him is ultimately not whether or not 
citizens know or care about climate change, let alone contribute themselves with some 
form of knowledge or initiative. “The needed technological solutions, documented best 
practices and economic resources” (Stoknes, 2014, p. 168) are, so Stoknes, already 
defined and in most cases accessible. The challenge that remains is that of getting “a 
majority of citizens in each democracy to support policies for implementing” (ibid.) 
these solutions. He calls this approach of shifting from information dissemination in the 
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hope of influencing behaviour to strategies directly targeting the latter a “radical 
rethinking of climate communication” (ibid.). 
Sterman (2011) expresses similar concerns regarding the potentially debilitating effects 
that the public may have on effective implementation of policy measures. In line with 
his abovementioned concern for various mental inabilities of people, he worries that 
people’s involvement in policy implementation may bottleneck science from playing its 
“appropriate role in climate policy” (Sterman, 2011, p. 811). People are, Sterman 
argues, generally bad at knowing things, due to a lack of scientific literacy (p. 815), and 
bad at deciding things, due to poor inquiry skills (p. 816). Dissensus within a 
democratic system is accordingly problematic because it is caused either “inadvertently 
by people without knowledge of the science” (ibid., p. 812), i.e. due to their inability to 
know, or it is “injected deliberately by ideologues and vested interests” (ibid.), i.e. due 
to their inability to decide what to belief. While climate policies should, so Sterman, be 
based on scientific knowledge, democracies are faced with the fact that “beliefs of the 
public, not only those of experts, affect government policy” (ibid.), and thus run the risk 
of having the most thorough policy assessments go to waste if not worse. 
The idea that a disagreement between, effectively, anyone, be it within science (in light 
of the import given to scientific agreement), between science and the public 
(representative of various dysfunctional gaps between the two) or between different 
members of the public (due to individually divergent biases and ideologies), is an in any 
case unproductive hindrance pervades the literature in this perspective. More than that 
however, disagreements, in particular between the public on the one and the scientific 
community or positions espoused by it on the other hand, are the essential issue that 
climate change communication is conceived to amend. The respective objectives of 
these amendments are differently perceived and include, in light of the portrayal above, 
the inducement of behavioural change (Howell, 2011; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010), the 
raising of awareness and knowledge (Nursey-Bray, et al., 2012; Lee, et al., 2015; 
Manzo, 2010), engagement (Poortinga, et al., 2011; Schweizer, et al., 2013; Scannell & 
Gifford, 2013), mobilization (Cox, 2010), and policy compliance (Sterman, 2011; 
Stoknes, 2014; Kronrod, et al., 2012; Zia & Todd, 2010). 
It is generally noteworthy that despite various conceptions of what form of 
communicative effort climate change communication represents, be it public 
campaigning (Cox, 2010), risk communication (Lee, et al., 2015; Spence & Pidgeon, 
2010), management (Nursey-Bray, et al., 2012), marketing (Kronrod, et al., 2012), or 
education (Lee, et al., 2015), the universal position is that it is a unilateral, top-down 
directed, targeted effort to disseminate specific sets of information or appeals to 
produce specific sets of attitudes and opinions for the purpose of inducing specific sets 
of actions. What is being aimed for is ultimately, and irrespective of these differences, 
agreement—whether it is on knowledge, priorities, concerns, policies, or actions. 
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These agreeable, desired ideas and actions are designed on the basis of scientific 
knowledge, and if communicated and disseminated effectively, they are assumed to 
ultimately produce a consensus in the public that mirrors the consensus reached in the 
scientific community. The underlying impetus of perspective I, persuasion, can be 
summarized with a research question posited by Zia and Todd (2010) in the conclusion 
of their article:  
How long do citizens remain committed to their religious and/or political 
ideologies after scientific messages are tailored to unravel unscientific beliefs 





Table 2. Perspective II: Critique 
 
The literature grouped under perspective II, critique, is methodologically grounded in 
media and communication studies. All four articles in this group analyse and discuss 
news media coverage and are thus, firstly, alike in methodology and research object. 
Articles of this perspective are at once interested in the various media channels and 
information sources, the actors that use these channels as platforms for their 
communicative efforts, and the receivers and consumers of the so mediated 
messages. The purpose of the so conducted research has several aspects. Topics of 
inquiry are, for one, the issue of framing, meaning the media’s selection of “what the 
issue/problem is; who/what is responsible; and what the solution is” (Hansen, 2011, p. 
15) and how, by doing so, they engage in the structuring of public and political attention 
and sense of urgency. Other concerns are the use of imagery and visual 
representations of climate change to, similarly to framing, promote or undermine a 
“sense of importance of the issue” (O'Neill, et al., 2013, p. 420), i.e. saliency, and how 
different vested interests employ messaging through media channels to “undermine 
competing positions” (Jaspal & Nerlich, 2014, p. 361). Lastly, the article by Brewer and 
Ley (2013) considers the question how all the above mentioned topics relate to issues 
of trust and credibility.  
Three articles express an interest in the ways in which media communication exerts 
influence on and is itself influenced by ideologies, both of its audience and its own 
actors. Hansen (2011) in particular is concerned with the role that ideology plays in the 
Articles Perspective on CCC as a 
Practice and Research 
Perspective on why CCC is 
of Concern 









CCC is critically analysed as a 
communication effort by 
variously interested claim-
makers and media outlets, who 
on the basis of their interests 
and in conflict with other 
interests exert political 
influence on the interpretation 
and sense making of 
consumers regarding the issue 
of climate change. 
 
The purpose of researching 
CCC is to develop an 
understanding of how various 
representations of climate 
change in media outlets 
compete with each other over 
trust and credibility in public 
discourses, how these 
influence the beliefs of their 
audience, and how they relate 
to issues of power and trust. 
Different media can express 
the same issue from vastly 
different perspectives, 
producing conflicting beliefs 
in the public. In this way, 
climate science is politicized 
according to the stakes of 
different interests. 
 
The media shapes 
perceptions of climate 
change, impacts political 
positions and influences the 
support and opposition to 
policies. 
 
Communicative power is 
exerted on consumers, 
potentially misinforming and 
manipulating them. The 
trustworthiness of various 
claim-makers is of import. 
Dissensus is seen as the 
result of conflicting 
information presented 
by different media. The 
politicization of climate 
change into a cultural 







values, and worldviews 
are of concern in so far 
as they are influenced by 
vested interests. 
 
Scientific knowledge is 
seen as subjected to 
interpretive flexibility, 
and can become 




way that various media represent the issue of climate change (p. 10). Science 
communication, he argues, has moved from communicating neutral evidence-based 
information to a contest over “winning hearts and minds” (ibid., p. 8). To do so, the 
media employs various forms of communicative approaches, visualizations and 
framings to “bolster and privilege particular ideological views and perspectives on 
climate change over others” (ibid., p. 18). Jaspal and Nerlich (2014) similarly argue, 
that the representations of climate change found in different news media appear 
“consistent with the ideological tendencies of the outlets” (p. 359). This influence of 
ideology is however two-sided, with the media in turn reporting on issues “in ways that 
maintain the integrity of their readers’ worldviews” (ibid., p. 360). In line with the focus 
of their article on trust, Brewer and Ley (2013) discuss how ideologies, which they 
relate closely to values, are a significant factor in supplying various information sources 
with credibility (p. 117). These ideological values and the trust they selectively provide 
“reinforce wider patterns of political and religious polarization surrounding 
environmental issues” (ibid., p. 129). 
Related to the issue of influence and ideology, three of the four articles, excluding the 
study by Jaspal and Nerlich (2014), explicitly discuss the issue of power. Hansen 
(2011) problematizes how different social actors have “very different degrees of power 
and very different communicative resources” (p. 21), in particular how the media is in a 
position of unequal power from which it exerts significant influence on “public concern 
about and awareness of environmental issues” (p. 18). O’Neill et al. (2013) similarly 
begin their inquiry by positioning agents in the media as a powerful shapers of public 
awareness on whom people rely to “interpret and make sense of the many complexities 
surrounding climate science” (p. 413). The fact that a multiplicity of different media 
outlets exists, all of whom employ different interpretations and translations of the issue 
of climate change, produces what the authors call a “cultural politics of climate change” 
(ibid., p. 420), namely a politicisation of the issue by conflicting media messages. The 
form of power Brewer and Ley (2013) are interested in is, in line with their earlier 
mentioned concern for trust and credibility, one of an epistemic kind. Holding a position 
of credibility in the public is a social resource that can turn media which are trusted into 
“powerful outlets for communicating scientific claims” (p. 129). Closely related to their 
idea of reinforcement of ideology discussed above, information sources endowed with 
trust can exert significant influence on what positions and actors shape public policies, 
and by doing so reinforce their social power (ibid., p. 116). 
The above mentioned concerns for power relate to the larger epistemic underpinnings 
and the question of the political within the literature of this perspective. It is argued that 
climate change in the form of its communicative representation, which ultimately is the 
form in which it is interpreted and made sense of by the public, is a contentious issue. 
Authors in this perspective refer to these contestations variously as “battles” (Hansen, 
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2011, p. 8), “conflicting arguments” (Brewer & Ley, 2013, p. 116), “cultural politics” 
(O'Neill, et al., 2013, p. 420) or “competing positions” (Jaspal & Nerlich, 2014, p. 361). 
Hansen (2011) further argues that “successful claims-making in society is closely 
related to the […] resources and political power” (Hansen, 2011, p. 20) that claim-
makers have at their disposal. As such the positions that prevail in these struggles are 
always contingent. Further, as this contestation is actively taking place on the level of 
the information sources available to the public, i.e. between different media, the various 
selection processes between these sources produce the aforementioned cultural 
politics of climate change (O'Neill, et al., 2013, p. 413). As different people consume 
different information they assume different positions. What ultimately enables the 
differently interested contestation over the issue of climate change is referred to by 
Brewer and Ley as the “certain amount of interpretive flexibility” (Brewer & Ley, 2013, 
p. 116) of science, namely that science has to select between various methodological 
options such as which evidence to consider, how much of it to require, and how to 
conceive of the various solutions to such problems. This flexibility subjects any 
particular item of scientific knowledge to the contingency of various individual, 
organizational and cultural stakes that may cause a “politicization of environmental 
science” (ibid.). 
To summarize, articles in perspective II, critique, are primarily interested in analysing, 
understand, and explicating the structures and conditions of media channels, in 
particular news media, and the role of various interests, values, and forms of power 
play therein. Rather than aiming to solve a designated problem through strategic forms 
of communication, the research aims at unfolding the ways in which different interests 
employ communicative strategies and the consequences these efforts have on the 
people they are aimed at. The issue of concern regarding dissensus about climate 
change is not that people inherently conceive of the idea differently, nor that climate 
science is inherently political, but rather that “the popular dissemination of scientific 
information can become entangled in broader political and religious clashes within 
society” (Brewer & Ley, 2013, p. 129). The “political leaning” (Jaspal & Nerlich, 2014, p. 
358) of different media outlets, their “competing agencies and interests” (Hansen, 
2011, p. 21), and their subsequently diverging representations of climate change can 
ultimately result, and in the example of Australia is argued to have resulted, in an 






Table 3. Perspective III: Facilitation 
The third and least commonly found perspective, facilitation, was expressed in three of 
the analysed articles. The perspective expressed in the article by Evans, Milfont and 
Lawrence (2014) is in fact located somewhere between perspective I and III. While 
their impetus for climate change communication is more in line with the problem solving 
position of the first perspective, their differences in epistemology and conclusions 
drawn from their research ultimately made me group them under perspective III. 
Articles in perspective III are methodologically grounded in social ecology and 
anthropology, and interested in the ways in which different communities in different 
respective contexts give meaning to and cope with climate change. The research in 
this perspective has a distinct interest in locality, including the local conditions and 
effects of climatic changes, the local resources and infrastructure available to actors, 
and the local knowledge of and meaning given to climate change (Niles, et al., 2015, 
pp. 179-181; Evans, et al., 2014, p. 71; Rudiak-Gould, 2012, pp. 47-48). Climate 
change is seen as both a global and local process that in its local dimensions has local 
consequences that require local responses. The category of responses that the articles 
are most concerned with are adaptation measures. Acknowledging that emission 
mitigation on a global scale may help in due course, Rudiak-Gould (2012) points to 
“locally developed adaptation measures” as the probable line of action to avert the 
most eminent damages. Similarly, Niles et al. (2015) argue that while mitigation 
measures may be a viable approach to alleviate the issue on a global scale, the 
development of “regional and local-based adaptation strategies” (p. 184) is the most 
Articles Perspective on CCC as a 
Practice and Research 
Perspective on why CCC is 
of Concern 












CCC is discussed and 




and communities to 
establish ties with each 
other, with the mutual aim 
of acquiring and providing 
knowledge about local and 
global processes of climate 
change. 
 
The purpose of researching 
CCC is to develop an 
understanding of the 
various climate contexts 
and capacities of different 
communities, the ways in 
which they relate and give 
meaning to climate change, 
and how to best establish 
reciprocal dialogue. 
Different people are affected 
differently by climate change, 
and have different means and 
resources to draw upon in 
their response to it. 
 
Climate change responses 
such as adaptation and 
mitigation are not 
technological solutions that 
can be planned and 
implemented top-down. If 
climate change 
communicators want to 
develop the ability to aid in 
various responses to climate 
change, they need to develop 
an understanding of the 
different contexts in which 
people live and their 
experiences and practices. 
Dissensus is discussed as 
the result of different 
contexts in which people 
live and the ways they are 
affected by and ultimately 
give meaning to climate 
change. 
 
Values and worldviews are 
of concern in so far as they 
are the basis from which 
climate change can be 
constructed as an issue 
worthy of attention and 
action. 
 
Scientific knowledge is 
discussed as contingent 
and in need to be 




effective way to deal with climate change. The heterogeneity of local ecological 
contexts, it is argued, requires “regional focus and planning” (ibid.) and makes broad 
adaptation strategies unviable. Evans et al. (2014) further point out that local 
adaptation is not only an important measure in itself, but a crucial stepping stone for 
the discussion of other climate change responses that significantly increases people’s 
“willingness to mitigate their own personal emissions” (p. 74).  
In light of the locality of the necessary responses the articles argue for, they advocate 
for bottom-up approaches in the respective design and decision-making of these 
responses. Scientists have to learn about local conditions and constraints first before 
they can contribute to potential strategies. To develop adaptation practices that are 
viable for a region it is thus necessary, Niles et al. (2015) argue, to be “working with 
farmers and rural communities to assess the most limiting factors and related 
adaptation practices” (p. 184). Evans et al. (2014) similarly argue, that if scientists want 
to productively contribute to local adaptation measures they should “consider 
developing stronger ties to local governments and community engagement processes” 
(p. 74). They further point out that “discussions local councils and communities will 
have” (ibid.) between each other are likely to contribute to these responses. Rudiak-
Gould (2012) goes further and argues that for a scientist to properly grasp local 
contexts and the possibilities they provide for conceptions of and responses to climate 
change, it is necessary to “discard the unidirectional model of science education in 
favour of a bidirectional model of dialogue” (p. 52). Scientists have to consider, he 
posits, that others (in the context of the argument that is Marshall Islanders) may have 
a “more holistic view of climate change” (ibid., p. 53) that science may not only educate 
but that in fact may educate science. If the cultural conceptions of climate change that 
science encounters are too wide, he concludes, then “perhaps scientific conceptions 
are too narrow” (ibid.). 
It is clear that knowledge in this perspective is not limited to one consensual scientific 
understanding of climate change, but instead is contextually diverse and in many of its 
local dimensions held by local actors rather than scientists. Scientific knowledge and 
local knowledge, Rudiak-Gould (2012) argues, has to be mutually translated to become 
meaningful. Citizen knowledge of climate change is not necessarily by itself meaningful 
to scientists, and scientific knowledge of the issue not necessarily by itself meaningful 
to citizens (Rudiak-Gould, 2012, p. 46). In addition, the vast contextual divergence 
between how people factually are impacted and what values they give to these impacts 
inevitably produces differences in how they conceive and think of climate change.  
Regarding the question of dissensus this means that for the issue of climate change, 
and once one assesses a context large enough or several contexts at once, it is 
inevitable. This does however not mean that this perspective ascribes political value to 
the contestation of the issue. For Niles et al. (2015) disagreement over climate change 
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is simply an unavoidable reality given the differences of ecological context people live 
in (p. 184), and rather posits an unfortunate hindrance to the actions that have to be 
taken in response. The article by Evans et al. (2014), which is the only of the three 
studies that problematizes let alone discusses the issue of a consensus gap between 
scientific and public agreement, has, if anything, a wistful hope for eventual consensus. 
While they, as mentioned above, point to inevitable future discussions, the authors 
prior to that subsume discussions under several other “methods for distributing 
information” (Evans, et al., 2014, p. 74) so that there is no indication that these are 
understood as involving any form of contestation or disagreement. 
The article by Rudiak-Gould comes closest to presenting an argument for contestation 
by introducing the concept of promiscuous corroboration. In the context of his study, 
promiscuous corroboration refers to a consequence of the inapplicability of the term 
climate change to the language and culture of the Marshall Islands. Due to linguistic 
differences, the conception of climate change resulting from the Marshallese (Ebon) 
translation of the term covers areas ranging from weather, to climate, to space, to 
sociocultural practices, to time itself (Rudiak-Gould, 2012, p. 49). Climatic changes are, 
in the conception of the Marshallese language, inextricably linked to sociocultural 
changes. The resulting conflation of changes in nature and culture is, as Rudiak-Gould 
argues, “not a conceptual confusion, but a valid worldview” (2012, p. 52) and one that 
reifies the salience and significance of the issue to the Marshallese people. Rudiak-
Gould thus argues that, as a promiscuous corroboration, the resulting disagreement 
over the conceptual understanding of climate change is not just beneficial but indeed 
necessary to endow the issue with local meanings (ibid.). This notion is however in no 
way equivalent to contentious democratic debate. 
5. Discussion 
The analysis reveals two aspects that apply universally to all analysed articles. First, all 
reviewed articles draw on, and explicitly so, social constructionist perspectives. This is 
insofar to be expected, and in fact validating of the approach to the database query, as 
the keywords used were explicitly designed to produce articles containing some 
element of subjectivity or construction. Interestingly enough however, I found that while 
the notion of a social construction of knowledge is consistently employed to describe 
and assess the reception of scientific knowledge by citizens, the knowledge on part of 
the researchers or science at large is seldom subjected to the same epistemic 
evaluation. This circumstance was most pronounced in the first perspective, 
persuasion, and less so in the second and third, critique and facilitation.  
The second universally noticeable aspect of the analysis is the absence of an explicit 
or extended argument for the legitimate contestation of climate change. Rather, the 
literature is virtually exclusively arguing for a depoliticized unification of positions, 
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regardless of its otherwise different foci. A distinctly political position, one that does not 
reject contentious debate and disagreement as a mere hindrance to climate change 
responses but acknowledges it as an inevitable political reality that calls for the 
strengthening of democratic fora through which it may be productively practiced, was 
not found explicitly argued for in a single article. The paper by Rudiak-Gould (2012) in 
group III, facilitation, came closest with his argument for promiscuous corroboration. 
Rudiak-Gould’s conception explicitly points to an instance in which a persistent, not 
merely processual, plurality of understandings of and positions towards the conception 
of climate change provides a valuable benefit to the ways in which humans cope with 
and give meaning and import to climate change. The idea of promiscuous 
corroboration does however refer to a contestation only in its dimension of 
disagreement and in so far as it relates to different understandings between differently 
situated contexts—in his specific case that between scientific and Marshallese 
understanding of the term climate change. There is no indication that a disagreement, 
let alone a contentious debate, within Marshallese society as such would be seen as 
an asset rather than an impediment. 
Between the three groups I found a noticeable difference in disciplinary alignment. A 
certain degree of alignment between the various epistemologies, methodologies and 
study foci was, as a matter of course, expected. The extent to which the general 
impetus for and conclusions drawn from the research align with the methodologies and 
epistemologies within the groups is however notable. The by far largest of these groups 
of articles, perspective I, consisted almost exclusively of studies based in social 
psychological analyses. In light of the influence that psychologists and other 
behavioural scientists such as Carl I. Hovland had on the historical development of 
communication studies, in particular in the Anglo-American context from which most of 
the analysed articles come, this finding is not unexpected (Loblich & Scheu, 2011). 
What is noteworthy however is the extent of agreement between the articles as to what 
function climate change communication is to pursue in society and what roles scientists 
and experts on the one, and citizens and laypeople on the other hand ought to have. In 
this regard, articles of group I unanimously argue for various strategic efforts to exert 
some form of influence on people for equally varied purposes. The advocacy ranges 
from more educational approaches that aim to raise awareness or salience, to 
stimulating efforts targeted at increasing engagement or mobilisation, to persuasive 
endeavours that attempt to induce behavioural changes or secure compliance with 
policy measures. In this, the understanding of climate change communication in group I 
corresponds squarely to the top-down conceptions of strategic risk and change 
communication presented in chapter 2 on methodology. The conceived purpose of 
climate change communication is the establishment of agreement among citizens by 
making them either adopt or comply with the scientific understanding of climate 
change. Individual positioning of people is thereby seen not as a resource of fruitful 
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democratically contentious debate, but a hindrance to the top-down diffusion of 
knowledge and implementation of policy. 
The methodologies of media and communication studies in perspective II were to be 
expected in an analysis of communication literature. Here it is important to point out 
how, within a similarly unidirectional conception of communication, a shift in attention 
from receiver, as in perspective I, to sender, as in perspective II, changes how defects 
within the communication system are attributed. In perspective I the issues of concern 
are flawed mental models and biased distortions on part of the public, while in 
perspective II the issues lie with the conflicts of ideologies and interests on the side of 
the media and its agents. The research impetus accordingly shifts from understanding 
people in order to strategically persuade them, to understanding media in order to 
critically denude them. In both these concerns, despite their differences, the two 
perspectives are in line with the definition of climate change communication presented 
at the outset of this study. They do, however, see themselves in different positions 
within the so devised inquiry, either as the ones pragmatically devising and conducting 
climate change communication, as in perspective I, or as the ones analytically 
assessing others engaged in these communicative efforts, as perspective II does. In its 
concerns for communicative power, perspective II touches on issues that may well be 
argued to apply not only to the context of news media but, as I have shown in the 
analysis of the literature in perspective I, academic literature too. Analysing how 
climate change communication experts use their communicative power to influence 
people may offer interesting new reflections. 
The social ecological and anthropological approaches found in perspective III, 
particularly in Rudiak-Gould (2012) and Niles et al. (2015), are notable in their 
departure from the strategic definition of climate change communication. Rather than 
understanding climate change communication as a strategic effort devised by 
designated communicators and directed at various receivers, irrespective of seeing 
oneself or other media actors in this role, this perspective understands communication 
as a more reciprocal process in which both parties are actively involved. In its impetus 
it is at once similar to and different from perspective I— it shares the primarily pragmatic 
concern of contributing to more successful climate change responses, but it is primarily 
concerned with local adaptation measures rather than global mitigation efforts. It does, 
of course, widely disagree with how the methods and processes to do so are devised.  
The issues of adaptation to and mitigation of climate change relate closely to the 
greater question of intergenerational equity. This concern for climate change as an 
intergenerational issue was, for example, explicated in the WCED’s Brundtland 
Report’s (1987) definition of sustainable development as accounting for the “needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (p. 43). Adaptation, as the mode in which we may adapt to the various climatic 
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changes happening right now, corresponds most closely with the needs of the present, 
while mitigation, meaning particularly the reduction of emissions to avoid further 
exacerbation of the issue, accounts more for future generations. As a highly complex 
problem, the questions this raises requires decisions on several levels, including 
ethical, economical, and ecological. Wherever decisions have to be made, experts are, 
of course, not far from offering recommendations on how people ought to make them. 
Economists have accordingly developed elaborate models that calculate and estimate 
various time discount rates and equity weighting factors according to which we can 
measure the inter-generational outcomes of investments into mitigation and adaptation 
(Hulme, 2009, p. 133). Ultimately, however, these rates and factors have to be set and 
decisions have to be made on the basis of value judgments that economic theory 
cannot prescribe. 
It was further shown that with different methodologies and conceptions of 
communication come different epistemological positions. There is a rather distinct 
difference between perspective I and III in particular as to the degree to which they 
ascribe to a positivist foundationalism on the one and a more constructivist 
postfoundationalism on the other hand. To be sure, as I have pointed out before all 
articles apply some form of social constructionism and discuss how knowledge and 
meaning is constructed by people on the basis of social processes. In perspective I 
however, this is less so an epistemological argument than it is a psychological one. 
Scientific knowledge, and the consensual expert position that emerges from it, is in the 
first perspective not questioned as being itself socially contingent. Rather, it is the 
various biases and social processes that first cast this unquestioned scientific 
knowledge into question. In the foundationalist position expressed in this perspective, 
the various disagreements by the public are epistemically unjustified due to their non-
alignment with science. To be sure, this is not to accuse the authors of scientism. It is, 
however, to say that there is a notable commitment to scientific knowledge as the 
epistemic foundation from whose support any epistemic positions towards climate 
change derive their justification. This is in contrast to perspective III, in which scientific 
knowledge carries an inherently contingent dimension. Regardless of whether a certain 
item of scientific knowledge is factually accurate, different local contexts may render 
this knowledge epistemically meaning-, and pragmatically useless. In any case the 
scientific understanding of climate change is, for the time being, incomplete, and 
responses to it require the aid of other forms of knowledge. This is, again to be sure, 
not to accuse these positions of relativism. It is to say, that non-scientific forms of 
knowledge can be justified, beneficial and, in fact, necessary, regardless of their 
degree of correspondence to scientific priors. 
Recalling my introductory remarks on the concept of the political being as much an 
epistemic as it is a political positioning, we can see this argument confirmed in the 
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convergence of epistemology and political consequence in the here assessed 
perspectives I and III. The positions arguing for an active, top-down subversion or 
circumvention of disagreement align with those assuming a foundationalist 
understanding of scientific knowledge and the solutions presented by it. Equally, the 
positions that are open to differences in perceptions and understandings of climate 
change and acknowledge the value of various bottom-up contributions of knowledge 
align with those that express limitations to scientific solutions and assume a more 
postfoundationalist stance towards the validity of knowledge. 
Two articles stand out in the severity of their conception of communicative top-down 
processes, namely those by Stoknes (2014) and Sterman (2011). Stoknes’ solution to 
what he titles the climate paradox is a self-described radical rethinking of climate 
communication along the lines of a behavioural inducement enterprise. The ultimate 
goal of this endeavour is to produce a majority compliance with the technological 
solutions to climate change as they are defined by scientific knowledge. What Stoknes 
offers here is of course not just a radical rethinking of climate communication but, in 
fact, a radical rethinking of democracy— if one wishes to still call it that. Not only does 
his account of the political processes involved in climate change reject any form of 
citizen input, but they border on subverting even the bare minimum of aggregative 
forms of democratic politics. Sterman in turn does not offer a similar clear-cut solution 
to what he considers the ills of democracies. The ineptitude of democratic citizens he 
professes, namely in knowing or deciding things, may of course justify their exclusion 
from political decision making processes. As he, however, applies this ineptitude to 
seemingly everyone that is not an expert, the vestige of decision makers remaining 
would hardly qualify as a democracy. 
The notions of induced agreement discussed here are far removed from the 
philosophical debates surrounding ideas of rational consensus, methodological 
monism, or deliberate democracy by thinkers such as Rawls, Peirce or Habermas. 
Rather, we are faced with what may aptly be titled a self-denying plea for technocracy. 
The implied notion is that society ought to merely be guided and educated on issues it, 
tragically, is ignorant towards. It is the so achieved enlightenment that is argued to 
harmonize and guide the actions of people, not a technocratic dictate. This idea is of 
course as old as continental philosophy itself, and was exposed as the amalgamation 
of technocracy and enlightenment in what Karl Popper calls “utopian social 
engineering” (Popper, 2013, p. 21) all the way back in Plato’s Republic. 
The issue of both Stoknes’ and Sterman’s positions in particular, and those of the 
perspective to which they belong in general, is of course not merely an ideological 
conflict between technocracy and democracy but in many ways of pragmatic concern. 
As the discussion of the articles in perspective III have shown, top-down processes of 
technologically devised and implemented solutions to climate change are contextually 
29 
 
limited in their applicability. Given the incompleteness and limitation of scientific 
knowledge of climate change, solutions devised solely on the basis of this knowledge 
are inevitably incomplete and limited. Not only is climate change as of now scientifically 
underdetermined, but it involves questions that lack ultimate, scientifically correct 
answers—answers that may simply not be found in the scientific realm. From the 
discussion above it is for example clear, that weighing between mitigation and 
adaptation is inherently a decision that has to be made on the grounds of value 
judgements. It cannot be made on the basis of a scientific understanding of the 
physical processes of climate change. In any case, however, knowing what climate 
change is and will be on the basis of meteorological understanding does not translate 
into knowing what it is and will be to the humans that face it. 
In his historical account of climate conceptions, the American geographer Milliam 
Meyer (2000) points to the fallaciousness of a “metereological fundamentalism” (p. 71) 
that subordinates human action to its climatic contexts. As desirable as such a 
determinism may be to some, social contexts and conditions cannot be extrapolated 
from natural ones. While the majority of positions found in this analysis avoid, by 
course of their methodological concerns for people, ascribing to a scientific 
reductionism that removes human beings from the equation, they tend to reduce them 
to a manipulable variable within it. Human agency is, however, hardly reducible to 
issues of compliance and resistance, like the level of lubrication of a cog in a wheel. 
Even the most pragmatist perspectives are forced to admit that this agency inevitably 
invokes questions of vastly different values and worldviews that act in vastly different 
contexts which are vastly underdetermined by our scientific understanding.  
6. Conclusion 
It is an unfortunate circumstance that with increasing potency of human action on 
climatic changes, the unmediated perceptibility of their consequences increasingly 
distances itself from the social realities in which people live. A cooling of local 
temperature following the drainage of swamps leaves both a cause and effect open to 
the immediate recognition of the people it affects. A global sea water rise of 
somewhere around 2 millimetres per year due to carbon dioxide concentrations in the 
atmosphere has far more substantial consequences but obscures any direct and 
immediate imputability. It is consequently understandable that science shows much 
concern regarding the communicative dissemination of its insights into the 
phenomenon—knowledge without which humanity would unquestionably be more 
ignorant towards what climate change is and what is causing it. These circumstances 
make climate change communication rightly an important project of the scientific 
community. What this communication is to look like, however, is not reducible to the 
question of how to effectively instil knowledge and induce action. Such a reductionism 
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presupposes not only what role experts and the public ought to have in the ordering of 
society, but what climate change communication itself is. 
Given how engrained the transmission conception of communication is in Western 
culture, it is perhaps not surprising that the very idea of a specific form of 
communication produces a unilateral conception of how it ought to be conducted. Take 
in addition then the venerating conception of the role of experts and professionals, and 
it is indeed easy to envision what climate change communication ought to look like: a 
strategic communication effort aimed at educating and persuading people to act in 
certain specified ways. Once we look behind the presuppositions of our epistemic 
heritage however, we can envision climate change communication as a democratic 
facilitation that does not impose a presumed epistemically privileged, particular position 
for society to adopt. Rather, it can be a process of opening up and strengthening 
channels of communication and participation; public fora for contentious political 
debate over the inherently political question of how we ought to organize society in 
response to climate change. Fora that provide the resources for information and 
expression; an exchange of knowledge rather than its imposition. It is, to be sure, 
myopic to presume that so established processes produce a participatory equity that 
allows for everyone to equally have his voice heard and considered. It is equally 
myopic to presume each and any position to be equally valuable and contributing to 
this so unfolding debate. It is, however, worth to consider that the evaluation of these 
positions ought to be the prerogative of those who carry the right for their approval and 
the responsibility for their consequences. It calls, however, in any case for a rejection of 
the assumption that a unified body of scientific knowledge allows for a predetermination 
of interests, values, and convictions. 
Politics in liberal democratic systems are negotiations about the principles in which to 
invest and according to which to organize action—debates over what is right and 
wrong, true and false, just and unjust. It stands to reason to assume that these 
negotiations are indebted to conceptions about what is known. This finds its expression 
in the finding, that those positions that acknowledge a constant contestability of what to 
think and do about climate change are the same that are farthest from subscribing to 
an objective determination of scientific knowledge. That we can find a convergence of 
epistemology, methodology and the conceptions of climate change communication 
reveals no less than the fact that scientists are just as all other members of the public 
subject to their contexts and conditions. Scientific positions on what climate change is 
and what ought to be done about it are contingent on which of the various existing 
scientific perspectives are taken. Many of the communication experts discussed in the 
preceding analysis have been so concerned with understanding what influences the 
positions of others that they forgot to assess what influences their own. 
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These concerns are of particular importance for the discussion of climate change, as it 
presents a strikingly convoluted and political issue. It is a process first and foremost 
caused by the opulence of the richest, most industrialized nations, that will first and 
foremost confront the poorest, least industrialized ones, with mitigation solutions 
developed and presented by the former that may well stifle the development of the 
latter, a development that is much needed to alleviate contemporary destitution while 
being well on its way to exacerbate it in the future. The assumption that the plethora of 
questions emerging from this situation can be answered by meteorological definitions 
and psychological disseminations exceeds the scope of the term ambitious. We are 
fortunate enough that human diversity offers us a multitude of arguments for a 
multitude of perspectives. We are rightfully committed to a diversity and plurality in the 
arts, languages, religions, traditions, cuisines, sports, and ecological systems. We are, 
then, equally right in committing to the diversity and plurality of the perspectives and 
values they produce. To be sure, just as there are cuisines that will be healthier to the 
body, there are perspectives and political decisions towards climate change that will be 
more conducive in sustaining a habitable planet and human prosperity. And just as 
science can help us understand what a certain food does to the body, is has an 
important role to play in contributing to our understanding of climate change and the 
prospects of various responses towards it. One may go as far as to commit to the belief 
that the best process by which to arrive at these perspectives is that of scientific 
inquiry. But even the shortest survey of our history reveals that the perspectives 
pronounced as scientific fact seldom hold their position for long, and that the dissenting 
perspectives that they rejected may, in fact, be closer to the truth. Why, then, should 
they not be given their say?  
A critical reader may at this point question whether such a call for the comprehensive 
contention of positions on climate change does not enforce a relativism that refuses to 
distinguish between bad and good ideas. The commitment to a contentious debate 
over climate change is however the very opposite to a submission to relativist 
ambivalence. It is this contentious process such a commitment ensures through which 
good ideas can be distinguished from bad ones. Just as it is our responsibility to 
protest that which we deem wrong, it is our responsibility to argue for that which we 
deem right, and to do so impassionedly and on the basis of our convictions. To argue 
for our ideas of the future is to participate in the political. It is to enact our role as 
citizens alongside the other members of the public of which we are part, not as 
conductors that dictate what voices ought to be heard. If the scientific community 
considers itself privileged to posit knowledge claims, then it is its privileged 
responsibility to enable their contestation—to establish and strengthen the fora through 
which ideas can be expressed and positions articulated. As citizens, it is in our very 
self-interest to do so, and it strengthens the democratic processes of which we 
ourselves are part. In the last analysis, political decisions are undecidable. They can, 
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however, be subjected to opinion, and are thus best made by an opinionated public 
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